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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF U'TAH
C. G. GREEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.BDGAR E. GARN and
CLEO \r. GARN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
9303

* * * * *
E. E. GARN,
Plaintiff and Respond·ent,
-vs.Case No.

J-ENSEN, et al.,
Respondents and
Cross Defendants,

9302

C. G. GREEN,
Intervenor and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT:S

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in appellant's brief is largely
accurate The appellant has unduly emphasized certain
facts and insufficiently emphasized or entirely disregarded other important facts. Theref'Ore, the respondents
are constrained to re-state the facts in their entirety.
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The parties will be referred to either as appellant
and respondents or by their nan1es. The two cases 'vHl
be referred to by their number in this Court. Italics 'vill
be our own. The dep'Osition of Dr. Green will he referred
to as the Green transcript and the deposition of Garn
will be referred to as the Garn transcript.
The appellant, Dr. C. G. Green, is a dentist and for
years practiced in Salt Lake City. He tired of the practice
of dentistry and thought he could make a living another
way. His memory vvras bad as to what occurred back in
those days, but he thought it was around 1940 when he
quit dentistry. He bought the lease on the Copper Club,
and at first he said he didn't remember what he paid
for it and then he said he thought he paid $15,000.00
down (Green Tr. 2-4). He was sure he had a contract,
but he didn't remember what it was and he had no
papers at all. Whether the price was $15,000.00 or he
paid $15,000.00 cannot be determined on account of the
doctor's poor mem'Ory. The 'vritten agreement on 'vhich
Dr. Green's claims are based showed that he owed additional money to one William Schmidt. There is nothing
in the record 'Or in the exhibits to sh0"\\ the contents of
the lease on the 'Copper Club. In fact, he didn't remember
that he ever saw a lease. He obtained an assignment and
he doesn't know whether he had a copy of a lease or
7

not. He didn't recall ever exhibiting a lease to the Garns.
There were two men, Griggs and Stanfield, who had an
interest in the lease. What it was does not appear and
he never did meet them (Green Tr. 4-7).
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So1netilne in 1947 \\"hile the plaintiff and his \vife,
Cleo Garn, \vere operating the Lone Pine Lodge in
l\iarysvale, Utah, they were contacted by Elmo Garff
and Lynn Garff, dba Garff l~ealty, licensed real estate
brokers. They represented Dr. C. G. Green for the purpose of inducing the Garns to purchase the interest of
Dr. Green in the Copper ·Club at Ely, Nevada. Dr. Gre,en
represented to the Garns that the prior owners had been
1naking from $70,000.00 to $80,000.00 per year, net, in
operating the club, and he also represented there was
$3,500.00 to $4,500.00 \Vorth of liquor stock (R. 57, Case
No. 9302).
The \vritten agreement marked Exhibit "A," Case
No. 9303, was dated December 10, 1947. It appears from
this agreement that the Garns issued a promissory note
in the sum of $5,000.00 to Dr. Green and assigned to him
all of their interest in the Lone Pine Lodge. The agreenlent also provided that the Garns were to receive the sum
of $500.00 a month as a living wage for operating the club,
deduct operating expenses, and thereafter pay to Dr.
Green each month all additional profits up to the sum of
$500.00. Should the profit exceed $500.00 a month, then
the Garns might p,ay any amount they wished on the
purchase price. The entire purchase price had to be paid
prior to the expiration of the term of the lease dated
June 12, 1946. ~There is nothing in the record to show
\Yhen the lease expired or its provisions. The contract
also provided that the payments to Dr. Green should be
applied first to any balances owing by Dr. Green to
William Schmidt or by Dr. Green to Schmidt's predecesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sors~

There is nothing in the record to show the interest

of William Schmidt or his predecessors. Then, finally,
the agreement provides that Dr. Green would be entitled,
upon ·failure of the Garns to perform after a 15-day
'vritten demand, to re-enter and take possession of the
premises of the Copper ·Club without the necessity of
court action.
This contract was prepared by the attorney for D-r.
_Green. The Garns were not represented. Before the Garns
entered into the agreement, Dr. Green represented he
had close to $5,000.00 worth of liquor stock, and when
they went out to examine the place, Dr. Green sho,ved
the Garns boxes of liquor stacked up \Yith the names
Hyrum Walker and various other kinds of liquor. \\"'"hen
they examined the liquor stock, there was not the amount
represented by Dr. Green, but, on the contrary, less
than $1,500.00 worth, and it turned out to be a private
stock less than a month old, flavored \v·ith \\rood chips.
Later when they opened the place, they had to pay Eva
Oureta $1,000.00 for licenses. She was the owner of
the premises. To operate, they had to sell their truck
for $1,900.00, sell a piano for $450.00, and borro·w· $500.00
from Garn's brother (Garn Tr. 29 and 30).
Nevertheless, the Garns endeavored to operate the
Copper Club and, owing to the fact of the general depression, they were unable to make any money out of
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the place and finally, after exhausting their resources
in the sununer of 1948,

~Ir.

Garn had a conversation with

Dr. Green in Salt Lake City and Dr. Green said he felt
bad that business had gone that 'vay and for Garn to
do the best he could, and if he could get someone in
therP and get something out of his interest, fine and
dandy (Garn Tr. 17).

Mr. Garn recognized his obligation to help Dr. Green
get something out of the club. "Well, absolutely! If I
hadn't done, I believe I would have just walked out.
At that point I believe I vvould have just walked out
and slamrned the door and left it like I found it" (Garn

Tr. 22).
That day in Dr. Green's office, Mr. Garn told him
his position and he would have to sell his equity, and

Dr. Green said,

"vVell,

go ahead and see what· you can

do 'vith it. See who you can find to get in and take it
over." Garn told Dr. Green he vvas 'vithout funds, 'vithout further means of getting any, and Dr. Green said,
"Okay" ( Garn Tr. 25).
1.Ir. Garn contacted the Garff Realty to dispose of
his interest and they declined. Then he walked down to
see C. Ed Lewis and explained the situation. Then about
August 16, 1948, he received the following letter from Dr.
Green:
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1001 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Mr. E. E. Garn
c/o Copper Club
Ely, Nevada
Dear Mr. Garn:
I had a long talk with Mr. McCormick last Saturday
and gained a considerable amount of information fron1
him concerning the sale of the Club. Apparently they
have been misinformed as to the actual set-up between
you and I, and as a result, have been having a tough
time in their efforts to dispose of the Club for you. He
also informed me that you have hindered instead of helping in the sale, this, perhaps because of your anxiety
to have done with the \vhole thing. But there is a way
that you can help a great deal, as I \Yill outline to you.
I told him that you \Vould be willing to take $5,000.00
and step out in favor of a new buyer, so he suggested
this procedure: 'Take a new listing for 90 days under
my signature at a pTice of $17,500.00 complete. ::\ O\V rest
assured that you will he protected to the extent of
$5,000.00. Anything over that amount comes to me, and if
a contract has to be written for any balance, a new one
will be written between the ne\v buyer and n1yself, thus
cancelling the contract between you and I. I hope this
is clear to you so there can be no misunderstanding when
a deal is finally negotiated.

Now, for a \Vord on how you can help,. If at any
time a prospect is sent out there, or if one should just
happen in, you can assun1e the roll of op,erator of the
Club and can do a good job of boosting it. Tell them
the business you are doing, and you might go so far as
to say you would like to buy it yourself if you could raise
the money. There is no need for them to know of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~Pt-up

hPt\veen us, as that seems to scare then1, making
the deal too co1nplicated; and that phase need not hinder
at all according to the understanding we now have. But
all negotiations must be referred to 1\Ir. McCormick.
1£ we can carry through on a set-up of this kind, 1\fr.
McCormick thinks he can move the Club and promises to
go to ''rork on it, but only under these conditions.
Let n1e hear fron1 you by return mail so that I can
let him know that you agree to this p-rocedure. I think
"\\~e will all benefit as everything will be on the up and
up and there will be no doubts in the mind of any one.
Let's get behind and push.
Respectfully,
C. G. GREEN, DDS
ThPn ·on September 18, 1948, Thfr. Garn signed Exhil>it ''G" "\vith the C. Ed Levvis Company and Burrows,
Jensen, and Payne, wherein he sold all of his interest
in the club to Burrows, Jensen and Payne. The Garns
received $3,100 in cash for their interest and a $900.00
note. After deducting commission and 6::::~enses, 1\fr.
Garn received $2,300 cash (R. 58, 59, Case :N v. 9302).
The same day, September 18, 1948, Exhibit "F," an
Earnest l\Ioney Receipt to purchase the Copper Club,
"\Vas signed by Burrows, Jensen and Payne. This was
not signed by Dr. Green nor Mr. Garn. Jensen, Burrows
and Payne took over the club sometime in September according to the pleadings, around September 18, 1948.
Thereafter, "\vith full knowledge of Dr. Green and with
his consent, Payne, Burrows and Jensen took over and
started operating the business (R. 59, Case No. 9302).
~Ir. Garn stayed three days after the new operators,
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Payne, Jensen and Burrows, took over to help show
them where the light switches were, the gas, and all that
should be done ( Garn Tr. 22).
Then Mr. Garn went to Santa Clara to op·erate a
restaurant with his brother. It was there that he next
saw Dr. Green sometime in February or ·March of 1949,
when Dr. Green stopped in their restaurant at Santa
Clara and told the Garns that the people out in Ely
were doing pretty good and he thought they would make
out okay (Garn Tr. 26).
Sometime in February, 1949, a car in which the
Garns had an equity was attached. They thought the
suit was for a $5,000.00 note they had given Dr. Green.
Mr. Garn contacted the Garffs and they said they would
take care of the $5,000.00 as soon as they sold the Lone
Pine Lodge, and Garn thought nothing 1nore about this
case, No. 9303 (R. 59, Case No. 9302).
The Garns heard nothing more about this case. 'They
knew nothing more about the claim of- Dr. Green against
them until October 2, 1959, \Vhen the Sheriff of lTtah
County levied on their equity in their home and cars
(R. 60, Case No. 9302).
The $900.00 note was not paid and 1Ir. Garn turned
it over to a St. George la,vyer for collection, who sent
it to Salt L·ake lawyers who started the action on December 29, 19'48, in Case No. 9302 (R. 1). The Garns were
never in the office of Gustin and Richards and never
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talked to then1 personally. Jensen, Burro,vs and Payne
answered and counterclaiined and brought in C. Ed Lewis
Company and McCorn1ick as a cross-complainant (R. 515, ·Case No. 9302).
On the 9th day ·of February, 19-±9, ·C. G. Green
brought suit against E. E. Garn and Cleo Garn, Case
No. 9'303. On the first cause of action, he asked for
$4,000.00 on the note and $500.00 attorney's fees. In his
second eause of action, he asked for $10,000.00 judgment
against them on account of the contract 'vith the Garns,
alleging that the Garns had breached the agreement
by selling and assigning the Copper Club without his
consent to Jensen, Payne and Burro,vs. On his third
cause of action, he asked for an additional $5,000.00, or
a total of $19,500.00 (R. 1-6, Case No. 9303).
A default certificate was entered in this case (No.
9303) on the 24th day of 1farch, A.D. 1949~ This was
later set aside and the defendants allowed to ans,ver (R.
21, Case No. 9303; answer and counterclaim, R. 21 and
25, Case No. 9302). In Case No. 9302 in his complaint
in intervention, Dr. Green asked for judgment against
the Garns in the sum of $10,000.00 and also an alternative for $3,100.00 received by him on account of the sale
of the ·Copper ·Club. Dr. Green filed an amended complaint in intervention on March 18, 1950, in Case No.
9303, almost a year after he had entered his default
against the Garns for $19,500.00 (R. 36-40, Case No.
9302. The complaints in intervention also sought relief
against E. E. Garn, Jensen, Payne and Burrows, and C.
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Ed Lewis Company and !1cCormick.
In paragraph 7 of his con1plaint in intervention (R.
38, Case No. 9302), Dr. Green alleged the place \vas "\vorth
in excess of $10,000.00, and Jensen, Payne and Burro"\vs
were willing to pay that to him. In paragraph 10 (R.
38A, Case No. 9302), Dr. Green admitted that he discussed \vith cross-defendant McCormick his interest in
the Copper Club and his \villingness to sell his interest.
Then Dr. Green filed his second amended complaint in
intervention on the 26th of April, 1950. In paragraphs
10 and 11 of the second amended complaint (R. 46, Case
No. 9302), Dr. Green alleged as foll·ows:
"10. Defendants entered upon possession of
the Copper Club at Ely, Nevada, on or about
September 18, 1948, and continued in peaceable
possession thereof until on or about March 15,
1949, on which date defendants abandoned the
said premises.
"11. The aforesaid possession of the defendants ''ras acquiesced in by the intervenor, and defendants' offer to pay the intervenor $10,000.00
was accepted by the intervenor's said acquiescence
and consent."
Defendants referred to were Jensen, Burro"\YS and Payne.
Then on April 4, 1956, Dr. Green as intervenor filed
a default certificate against E. E. Garn (R. 51, Case X o.
9302), and on the same day he took a default judg1nent
against E. E. Garn for $10,000.00. Nothing \vas done
then in the case until October 7, 1959, "\vhen he obtained
a garnishment and writ of attachment and garnisheed
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the wages of ~1r. Garn and attached the automobiles
and home of Mr. and Mrs. Garn. The plaintiff moved
to set aside the judgment and default and be allo,ved
to ans,ver (R. 54-63, Case No. 9302). The court on Deceinber 6, 1959, granted the motion and the order "~as
signed (R. 65-66, Case No. 9302).
[n the case of Dr. Green against Mr. and Mrs. Garn,
Case No. 9303, the plaintiff filed a default certificate on
the 24th day of March, 1949. This was prior to the time
he filed his complaint in intervention in Case No. 9302.
The Garns 1noved to dismiss this case (R. 14-15, Case
No. 9303). The Court granted the motion to dismiss the
first cause of action, which was for $4,500.00 on account
of the original note given by the Garns to Dr. Green.
Thereupon, on the 14th day of December, 1959, appellant's
attorney served two copies of the complaint in this case on
the defendant, and thereafter the Garns file·d their ans\ver and counterclaim (R. 21-25, Case 9303). The default
of the Garns had been set aside. They were allowed to
answer.
On the 25th day of April, 1960, Dr. Green moved
for sumn1ary judgment against the Garns for $5,000.00
on the third cause of action, and agreed if the motion
'
\Vas granted to dismiss the second cause of action and
also dismiss Case No. 9302 with prejudice. The Garns
then moved for summary judgment against Dr. Green
in both cases. The motion for summary judgment by
Dr. Green \vas denied and the motions of the Garns in
both cases were granted.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
PRELIMINAR.Y ST'ATE.MENT

The appellant's brief on Point II, "Was there an
abandonment of the premises by the appellant~" the
respondents feel this is not a question involved in the
case; it should have been, "Was there an abandonment
of the contract, or was there an abandonment by the
appellant of any -claim against the Garns ~"
In view of that, the respondents 'vill discuss this
case under the following points:
1. T·HERE WAS A RESCISSION OF THE DECEMBER
10, 1947 ICQN'TRACT.
(a)

There was a surrender of the premises, and

(b) There was an abandonment of any claim against
the respondents by the appellant.

THE APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
RELIEF FROM THE GARNS.
2.

ARGUMENT
POIN'T I
THERE WAS A RESCISSION OF 'THE DECEMBER 10,
1947 CONTRACT.

Generally speaking, a la~'ful rescission of a contract
by mutual agreement puts an end to it for all purposes.
Accordingly, it is held that in the absence of circumstances pointing to a different intention, neither party
can 1naintain an action on the rescinded contract for pre-vious breach thereof. Note 24 A.L.R. 253.
Utah has subscribed to this doctrine. In the case of
!Jf,egeath v. Ashworth, Supreme Co~nrt of Utah (Mar. 2,
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Utah 564, 196' Pac. 338, the defendant testified
that some months after sale of car and the execution of
the note, he advised plaintiff that the car was of no service to him and asked him to give back the note and declare
the deal off, to which he testified the plaintiff replied:

1921),

:)7

"All right, take the car and put it in my barn."
Accordingly, the defendant returned the car to the
premises of the plaintiff and, finding the garage closed,
left the car in the yard near the garage. That was something like five years prior to the institution of the action
and the car had remained in the possession of the plaintiffs ever since. Court held a rescission and judgment
for defendant and it was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Talbot v. Anderson, Supreme Court of Utah (Oct.
28, 1932), 80 Utah 436, 15 P:2d. 3.50:

"An action cannot be maintained for the
breach of a contract which has been rescinded or
canceled, even though such rescission or cancellation is by mutual consent, either express or implied, of the parties."
See also Schwab Safe & Lock Co. v. Snow, 47 Utah 199,
152 Pac. 171; and Black on Rescission, Vol. 2, page 1072.
Restatement of Contracts, Section 406(a):
''Agreement to rescind need not be expressed
in words. Mutual assent to abandon a contract,
like mutual assent to form one, may be manifested
in other ways than by words. Therefore, if either
party even wrongfully expresses a wish or intention to abandon performance of the contract
and the other party fails to object, there may be
sometimes circumstances justifying the inference
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that he assents. If so there is rescission by mutual
,
assent ....
Considering the facts most favorably to the appellant, Dr. Green, there is no escape from the conclusion
that there was a mutual rescission. When they entered
into the contract the Garns made a payment of $5,000.00,
represented by the assignment of their interest and sale
of their property in the Lone Pine Lodge at Marysvale.
The contract did not provide for any special monthly
amount to be paid by the Garns, but only that they \Vere
to give Dr. Green 50% after they paid the expenses and
took $500.00 per month as a living wage.
Various false and fraudulent representations \Yere
made by Dr. Green as to the earnings of the club and as
to the condition of the club to be operated. ·The Garns
went out to operate the place and \Yhen they did find
out about the false and fraudulent representations, they
\Vere in such a financial condition that they had no
choice but to try and operate the club. The Garns never
did 1nake the $500.00 living "Tage, let alone anything in
excess, so at no time ,~(ere they behind in any payments.
After selling practically everything they owned and
borrowing everything they could, they found in the
Sun1mer of 1948 they could no longer operate. Garn
\vent to see Dr. Green and Dr. Green told him to do the
best he could, and get somebody else in these and get
so1nething out of his interest (Garn Tr. 17).
Dr. Green talked to ~Ir. !IeCorn1ick, a real estate
salesman for C. Ed Le\vis Con1pany and a cross-defend-
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ant in Case No. 9202. Dr. Green told him to go ahead
and sell the place and also told him what Green's interest "'"as in it (Green Tr. 12). The letter of Dr. Green
to E. E. Garn in August 1948 corroborates this. The
letter indicates that he had a long talk with McCormick.
This letter proves that ~1cCormick and C. Ed Le,vis
·Company were his agents. Dr. Green goes so far in his
letter that he advised the Garns to use fraud and deceit
if necessary to get someone to take over the business.
In the letter Dr. Green says that everything will have
to be referred to Mr. McCorrnick. 1fcCormick obtained
Jensen, Burro,vs and Payne to purchase the interest of
the Garns. McCormick then sold the doctor's interests to
them. This agreement, Exhibit "G," was signed by
Jensen, Payne and Burrows, but not by the doctor. Jensen, Payne and Burrows took over the operation of the
club about September 18, 1948, and in his pleadings the
doctor said that this was done by his (the doctor's)
acqui·escence and consent. Dr. Green at no time warned
the Garns that he was holding them to the lease or the
contract. His actions and his words and his written
letter demonstrated that he vvas releasing Garns en toto
and accepting Jensen, Payne and Burrows. This rescission, cancellation and abandonment not only was oral
but in writing of Dr. Green and there is also the acts
of the parties.
17 CJS, page 880, Sec. 388:

"The cancellation, abandonment, or rescission
of a written contract may not only be written but
it may also be oral or by implied agreement, vvhich
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may be shown by the acts of the parties and the
surrounding -circumstances."
There was a surrender. The Garns never had the
lease; they only had a right to the lease when Dr. Green
or his agents, the Garffs, turned it over to hin1. The
doctor didn't even know what the provisions in the
lease were, and the Garns had never seen the lease, but
it is conceded that the doctor had some right of possession there. For awhile he allowed the Garns to occupy
the premises_, then when the premises were turned over
by Dri Green's agent, ~icCormick, to Jensen, Payne and
Burrows, there 'vas a surrender of the pre1nises as far
as the Garns were concerned. It was by the actions of
Dr. Green that the Garns were supplanted by Jensen,
Payne and Burrows. This was recognized by Dr. Green
and in his pleadings he said that they were there by
his consent and acquiescence and, the ref ore, Jensen,
Payne and Burrows should pay him. Dr. Green allowed,
consented, and contracted so that Jensen, Payne and
Burrows took over the contract and the possession of
the place. Under the very terms of the original contract, the Garns would have to retain the possession
in order to p-ay as provided in the contract. There "Tas
a surrender. See Belanger v. Rice, Su,preme Court of
Utah (J~tly 2, 19/54), 2 Utah 2d 250, .:21'2 P:2d. 173; John
C. Cu}ler v. DeJay Stores, 3 [Jtah 2d 107, 279 P2d. 700;
Dunles Inc. v. F~delity Co,mpany, 165 S.W. 612.
J. K. Arntsby Co. v. Grays Rarbor Com1nerciaJ Co.
rt al., Supre1ne Cou,rt of Oregon (1912),. 123 Pac. 32:
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~'The

ter1n 'rescission,' in relation to contracts, can only apply to the unmaking of the
contract, the revoking of it by mutual agreement
of the parties; or it may be effected by an attempt to revoke the contract by one party, acceded
to by the other, or a breach by one which precludes him from any remedy thereon, and for
which the other party revokes it. Miller v. Shelburn, 15 N.D. 182, 107 N.W. 51; Bannister v.
Read, Giln1an (Ill.) 9'2.
"In the case before usJ the cancellation was
not mutually accomplished, as each party acted
independently; but each recognized the contract
as at an end. When a contract is mutually rescinded, the parties are placed in their original
position, as if it had not been made."
On page 35:
"In Graves v. White, 87 N.Y. 463, 465, it is
said: 'The doctrine of these authorities is that
the refusal of one party to perform his contract
amounts on his part to an abandonment of it.
The other party thereupon has a choice of remedies: He 1nay stand upon his contract, refusing
assent to his adversary's attempt to rescind it,
and sue for a breach, or, in a proper case, for
a specific performance; or he may assent to its
abandonment, and so effect a dissolution of the
contract by the mutual and concurring assent of
both parties. In that event, he is simply restored
to his original position, and can neither sue for a
breach nor compel a specific performance, because the contract itself has been dissolved.' "
Call it what you will, there was a mutual rescission
of the contract, a waiver by Dr. Green of any claim
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against the Garns, and there was a cancellation and
abandonment of the contract and surrender of the premises. Jensen, Payne and Burrows were accepted as new
tenants by Dr. Green. They were also substituted as
purchasers of the Copper Club.
POINT II
DR. GREEN, THE APPELLANT, IS ES'TOPPED FROM
CLAIMING RELIEF AGAINST THE GARNS.

By Dr. Green's letter and by his conversation, the
Garns were given to understand that if someone else
took over the Copper Club they could leave and take
what little money they could get for their interest in
the club and be on their way 'vithout any further claim
from the doctor. Even in February 1949 at Santa Clara,
the doctor told the Garns that Jensen, Payne and Burrows were doing fine and would make out all right. All
the circumstances surrounding the transaction are to the
effect that Dr. Green had released the Garns. The Garns
could not turn the place over to Jensen, Payne and
Burrows and still comply with the contract of December
10, 1947. Dr. Green knew the Garns 'Yere do,vn and out
and broke. He was \\rilling that they should get out of
the picture. His letters and his conveTsations contradict
his deposition as to McCormick not representing him,
and the pleadings that he filed in Case No. 9303 "'"ithout
question show that he acquiesced and consented to the
Garns being supplanted by Jensen, Payne and Burro,vs.
The doctor waived all rights against the Garns, and his
conduct 'v-as such that he is estopped to deny that he con-
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sen ted to or intended a waiver or rescission. Kelly v.
llicl1ards et al., Supreme Court of Ut~ah (Nov. 4, 1938),
9:1 Utah 560, 129 A.L.R. 164, 83 P2d. 731; 31 C.J.S. 260,
Sec. 69.
CONCLUSION
Dr. Green was never able to make a success out of
the operation of the 'Copper Club, but he attempted to
1nake a success of this venture by litigation.
It has been difficult to follow through the maze of
cases commenced by Dr. Green surrounding this Club.
1. Green v. the Garffs in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, Case No. 84478 (Nov. 1947), involved $5,000.00 note of the Garns.
2. C. G. Green v. Garns, Case No. 9303 (Feb. ·9,
1949), for same relief asked against the Garffs,
plus $15,000.00 additional.
3. Case No. 9302, Dr. Green as intervenor v. Frances B. Jensen et al., Dr. Green v. C. Ed Lewis Co.
and W. A. McCormick, and Dr. Green as intervenor against the Garns (Jan. 1950).
In this case, he asked for $13,100.00 against the Garns,
notwithstanding he had already entered a default in Case
No. 9303 on March 24, 1949. In April 1956, a default
judgment was taken against the Garns in Case No. 9302
for $10,000.00.

Thus, we see that Dr. Green attempted to recover
from practically everyone connected with him in any way
in the Cop·per Club. The Garffs were his agents, as were
C. Ed Lewis ~c·ompany and W. A. McCormick, and, of
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course, Jensen, Payne and Burrows were the people he
permitted to take over the operation of the club and to
supplant the Garns.
Motions to dismiss these two cases for failure to
prosecute were denied. The respondents maintain that
this issue is still before this Court, or any other issue
that would justify a summary judgment in favor of the
respondents.
There was mutual rescission which was amply proved
by the admissions of Dr. Green, the letter of Dr. Green,
his pleadings, and the actions of the parties.
By the same token, there was an abandonment of
the contract with the Garns by Dr. Green, and as far
as the possession of the premises was concerned, there
was a surrender by Dr. Green's accepting Jensen et al.
as the operators and occupants of the club; and Dr.
Green is estopped to deny no\Y that he consented to or
intended a waiver or rescission of the contract.
The summary judgments of the lower Court should
be upheld. It would he highly inequitable to hold otherWise.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYS. I\IcCARTY
Attorney for Respondents
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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